Abstract-A secure scalar product protocol is a type of specific SMC problem, and has found various applications in many areas such as privacy-preserving data mining, privacy-preserving cooperative statistical analysis, and privacy-preserving geometry computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In secure multiparty computation (SMC) [1] [2] , a set of parties want to jointly compute a function of their inputs over the Internet or any computer network without revealing to the other participants any information about their private inputs. A secure scalar product protocol [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] is a type of specific SMC problem, and its goal is that two parties jointly compute the scalar product of their private vectors, but no party will reveal any information about his private vector to another party. As a building block, secure scalar product protocol has found various applications in many areas such as privacy-preserving data mining [3] [4] , privacy-preserving cooperative statistical analysis [5] , and privacy-preserving geometry computation [6] . To solve this problem, many solutions have been proposed [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , and a nice overview of the problem and the security properties of some solutions were given in [3] .
In [3] , it was shown that if a vector has low support (the support of a vector is defined by the number of nonzero elements in this vector), another party will learn half elements of this vector, further learn the whole vector with a high probability. Then the authors proposed a new secure scalar product protocol, which is based on homomorphic encryption with plaintext space m Z for some large m . The protocol is secure in the semi-honest model [2] , assuming that , However, all of these protocols considered only positive integer vectors. How to deal with negative vectors is an important and interesting issue because of their broad applications in reality.
In this paper, we make an extension to the solution in [3] , which enables the scheme to be used in distributed decryption, and to handle negative vectors. Furthermore, we describe two-party secure computation of a public Boolean function on private input of each party. Finally, we propose two applications of our secure scalar product protocol to computational geometry. The former is to determine which side a private point 0 P , held by a party (Alice), lies in a directed line segment 1 2 P P uuuur , held by another party (Bob), but neither of them wants to reveal its secret to another party. The latter is a conditional oblivious transfer protocol based on the relation between a point 0 P , held by a party (Alice), and a directed line 1 2 P P uuuur , held by another party (Bob). Assume Alice has two secret messages 0 1 , s s , and wishes (obliviously to her) to transfer one of them to Bob depending on which side 0 P lies in 1 2 P P uuuur , but will not learn Bob's private directed line and the location relation of one's own point with Bob's private directed line.
II. SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND BUILDING BLOCKS

A. Some Concepts in Computational Complexity
( 
B. The Semi-honest Model
We assume that all parties are semi-honest. Roughly speaking, a semi-honest party is one who follows the protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations and might derive the other parties' inputs from the record. A protocol is private in the semi-honest model if whatever is obtained by a party participating in the protocol also can be computed from its input and output only. This assumption is formalized by simulation paradigm as follows [2] . Let
be a probabilistic polynomial-time functionality and ∏ be a two-party protocol for computing f . The view of the first party during an execution of ∏ on the input ( ) S such that 
C. Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
An encryption scheme is homomorphic [9] [10] if for some operations and * ,
where x and y are two elements from the message space and k is the key. If * is an additive (multiplicative) operator, the encryption scheme is said to be additive (multiplicative) homomorphic. A useful property of homomorphic encryption schemes is that an operation can be conducted based on the encrypted data without decrypting them. If an encryption scheme is additive and multiplicative homomorphic simultaneously, it is said to be fully homomorphic [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . A fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be used to fulfill the secure scalar product protocol, and it can make significant improvement in communication complexity, but it would suffer huge computational overhead with current state of the art. Therefore, we will not adopt the fully homomorphic encryption scheme, instead of adopting an only additive homomorphic encryption scheme, I. Damgärd and M. Jurik's cryptosystem in s n Z , as our building block in this paper. The encryption scheme is as follows [10] 
D. Re-encryption
be the same as that of ( , ) G H .
The computational cost of Re-encryption is twofold that of the original scheme.
In the following we will denote ( ) E m as ( ; ) h E m r when no misunderstanding is possible.
E. Distributed key Generation
Alice (Bob) picks 
F. Distributed Decryption
Given an encrypted message ( , ) G H , Alice
, and proves its correctness by showing the equality of logarithm of 1 h and 1 G , that is, proves 
The plaintext can be derived by computing
Intuitively, a mix network [13] is a multi-party protocol that takes as input a list of ciphertext items and from this produces a new, random list of ciphertext items such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the underlying plaintexts of input and output items. In other words, the underlying output plaintexts represent a random permutation of the underlying input plaintexts. The security of a mix network is characterized by the infeasibility for an adversary of determining which output items correspond to which input items.
Our mix network is similar to the one in [13] . Let the input to the mix network be a sequence of ciphertexts 1 1 2 2 ( , ),( , ), ,( , )
, and the output is a random permutation and re-encryption of the inputs, namely a sequence (1) (
G H , and σ is a random permutation on k elements.
The computational cost of ΜΝ is k -times that of the employed encryption scheme.
H. Shuffle
A shuffle [14] of ciphertexts 1 2 
is a new set of ciphertexts 1 2 , , ,
, such that both sets of the ciphertexts have the same plaintexts. If we are working with I. Damgärd and M. Jurik's cryptosystem, 1 2 , , , k C C C L can be shuffled by selecting a permutation σ and setting
It is impossible for anybody else to see which permutation was used in the shuffle because of the semantic security of the cryptosystem. On the other hand this also means that anybody else cannot check if we did make a correct shuffle directly.
The computational cost of a shuffle is k -times that of the employed encryption scheme.
I. Distributed Plaintext Equality Test (ΠΕΤ )
Our protocol is similar with the one in [13] . 
III. A SECURE SCALAR PRODUCT PROTOCOL IN FIELD
In the following, we will make an improvement on the solution in [3] , such that it can be realized based on I. ( , ) X u , and proceeds as follows. (1) generates randomly a vector If the elements of vectors are negative, we can transform negative elements to positive elements, then perform scalar product of positive elements. For example, we would like to compute the scalar product of two vectors ( 2, 3, 6, 7) − − and (4, 5,2, 6) − − in 15 Z , we can firstly transform them to (13, 3, 9, 7) and (4, 10, 2, 9) , then compute ( (1) Alice applies ΜΝ to T (using y as the encryption key), obtains T ′ and publishes it.
(2) Bob shuffles T ′ , obtains T ′′ and publishes it. If the function φ is a bitwise sum of , u v , the step (4) in Protocol 2 is modified as that Protocol 4 shows.
Security: The security of Protocol 2 can be derived from the security of the employed building blocks such as ΜΝ, shuffle and ΠΕΤ.
Resource analysis: Because all
are public, it is not necessary to consider the communication cost. Because step 1~3 can be precomputed, the computational cost is dedicated by step 4, which needs 2 
V. TWO APPLICATIONS IN COMPUTATIONAL GEOMETRY
In this section, we give two applications of the secure scalar product in secure computational geometry.
A. Secure Location of a Point to a Directed Line Segment
Suppose that there is a triangle in the plane with the vertices 1 1 1 2 2 2 ( , ), ( , ) P x y P x y and 0 0 0 ( , ) P x y . Then the signed area of the triangle is half of the determinant ( , , ) D P P P is positive if and only if 1 2 0 ( , , ) P P P forms a counterclockwise cycle, i.e. 0 P lies in the left of directed line segment 1 2 P P uuur , and negative if and only if 1 2 0 ( , , ) P P P forms a clockwise cycle, i.e. 0 P lies in the right of directed line segment 1 2 P P uuur [24] . determine which side 0 P lies in the directed line segment 1 2 P P uuur , but neither of them wants to reveal its private point to another party. The protocol is as follows. Protocol 3 (Secure location of a point to a directed line segment)
Inputs: Alice has a private point 0 0 0 ( , ) P x y and Bob has a private directed line segment with direction from 1 1 1 ( , ) P x y to 2 2 2 ( , ) P x y . Outputs: Which side of 0 P lies in the directed line segment 1 2 P P uuur .
( In Protocol 1, we take 3 l = , and obtain the resource needed in Protocol 3 as follows. The communication cost is [4 10]log log s n τ + + bits. Alice needs to perform 3 encryptions and 1 decryption, and Bob needs to perform 3 multiplications and 1 encryption.
To determine the relation of 0 P with 1 2 P P uuuur , it suffices for both of them to determine 0 The security of Protocol 4 is guaranteed by that of Protocol 2.
Similarly to Protocol 2, it is not necessary to consider the communication cost.
The computational cost is 0 24N times that of PET. In computational geometry, if we measure the distance by meters, the value of 16-bit length can measure 65536 meters, so it is enough to take 0 16 N ≤ in reality.
B. Conditional Oblivious Transfer based on the Relation between A Point and A Directed Line
A conditional oblivious transfer is a variant of oblivious transfer [27] [28] . Intuitively, it considers the following problem: two participants, Alice and Bob, have private inputs x and y respectively, and share a public predicate ( ) , Q ⋅ ⋅ . Alice has two secret messages 0 1 , s s , and wishes (obliviously to her) to transfer one of them to Bob depending on Q , but will not learn Bob's private input and the value of Q .
The conditional oblivious transfer is very useful to computational geometry. For example, there are two companies, a railway company and a construction company. The railway company wants to build a railway, while the construction company wants to erect a building. But, the construction of railway will bring inconvenience to the pass in and out of the residents in the building, and the extent of inconvenience depends on which side the building lies on the railway. Therefore, the railway company will compensate the construction company in accordance with which side building lies on. The railway company would not like to tell the construction company where the railway will be built and two compensation schemes, in case the construction company can decide where his building will be erected, while the construction company does not tell the railway company where his building will be erected, in case the railway company can decide his own scheme according to the scheme of construction company to reduce the fee to be paid.
We propose a conditional oblivious transfer scheme based on Protocol 4.
In the scheme, after finishing Protocol 4, both of participants do not decrypt 
VI. CONCLUSION
We have given 5 two-party secure protocols: a secure scalar product protocol based on I. Damgärd and M. Jurik's cryptosystem, secure computation of a public Boolean function, secure location of a point to a directed line segment, secure determination of scalar product by the most significant bit, conditional oblivious transfer based on secure determination of scalar product by the most significant bit. The security, communication cost and parties' computational cost in all protocols are analyzed.
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